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21 October 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. CHILDS

SUBJECT:

Comments supplementing my memorandum of  
18 October 1949 regarding the proposed  
report of the Director to the NSC

OGC HAS REVIEWED.

Preface

Considering the lengthy investigative process which has been conducted in the intelligence field for the last year and a half, which culminated in the Dulles report and the issuance of the NSC 50, the NSC must be somewhat tired of all of this "negativeness." Because of the fact that the Dulles report and the NSC 50 were presumed to evaluate the total intelligence situation, I doubt if the NSC will be sympathetic toward any proposal which will start now a chain reaction of new intelligence investigations and examinations. Regardless of our high or low esteem for the Dulles report and the NSC 50 based thereon, our primary aim at this juncture should be to work progressively toward strengthening the organization for intelligence throughout the Federal structure in the interest of national security. Any step which we take should not be the motivating factor for starting intermachine squabble at high level. God forbid that we should ever be responsible for starting a "dirty-linen washing contest" in any degree similar to the struggle on policies and strategy now going on between the Navy and the Air Force. Even if the National Security Council's Staff is willing to take our viewpoints and have them sent to higher level, we must remember that the ingrained, antagonistic feelings of some of the Departments will throw back ideas at us just as hard as we sling our shots at them. Accordingly, I plead for salutary caution if the Director is going to take the step which he proposes.

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1. To overcome many of the difficulties confronting the Director in carrying out the responsibilities assigned to him under the National Security Act of 1947 and the subsequent Directives from the NSC, I believe that the total remedy falls into two compartments:

- a. Those steps which can be taken today by the Director under present authorities and policies and,
- b. Those items that need additional clarification and new Directives.

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Those steps which can be taken today by the Director under present authorities and policies.

(1) For the last few years, the Director has operated on the very solid principle that coordination by using the "angel-tactic" of direction will bring little result because of the lack of goodwill that will result among the agencies being coordinated. However, experience has shown quite clearly that the goal of prior agreement has resulted in watered-down products, innumerable delays and circuitous procedures. Thus, I believe today, the Director should decide that the period of "coordination by prior cooperation" has ended and that even though the IAC agencies will still have an opportunity to express their viewpoints, unanimity will not be necessary before we send papers to the NSC for a decision.

(2) In keeping with this concept of strengthening the hand of the Director to assume "forthright initiative and leadership", the NSC approved the NSC 50 recommendation to make him, not only a member, but also Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This step on the part of the NSC gives more potency to the hand of the Director.

(3) Even though the word "material" as used in NSCIB 1.2 is very limiting in its application, it seems to me that we can do much more toward formalizing the authority given to the Director to make "surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence material ....."

(4) Much of our difficulty of today stems from attempting to operate with "leadership" of directives issued by the leader, i.e., the DCI, when such directives are puny and weak to accomplish their objectives. The reason they are so flimsy is the policy of goodwill which we have followed in allowing each Agency to have a "crack" at the concepts in an effort to achieve unanimity of acceptance before issuance. Because of practical bitter experience, we should no longer allow the lack of unanimity to delay the issuance of proposed DCI's. We would achieve more strength in the proposed directives if we sent them to the NSC for decision in accordance with Paragraph 3.g, NSCIB 1.

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(5) We should, today, examine our established policies and procedures to see if more can be done to get "free and unrestricted interdepartmental exchange of intelligence information" between Departments and Agencies of the Government as is called for in NSCIB 2.7.

(6) Have we, up to the present, taken sufficient steps to seek specifically "the assistance of the IAC intelligence agencies" to minimize the necessity of agencies developing intelligence outside of their fields of dominant interests? (NSCIB 3.a(4)).

(7) Have we worked out a production "plan" in collaboration with the IAC agencies in order to obtain from them departmental segments in the total mosaic of national intelligence? (NSCIB 3.a(3)).

(8) In the area of producing "intelligence reports or estimates undertaken mutually", have we, with sufficient definitiveness and continuous follow-up, requested and received "such special estimates, reports and periodic briefs or summaries prepared by the individual Departments or Agencies..."? (NSCIB 3.g (4)). (underlining supplied)

(9) Have we, as the central responsible coordinating body, taken the leadership in promoting exchange of information "on projects and plans in the production of staff intelligence"? (NSCIB 3.g (5)).

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Unless we can furnish non-quibbling, concrete answers to the questions raised in the last few paragraphs, instead of speaking about departmental negative attitudes, I believe the Director might be in a very vulnerable spot in making his presentation to the NSC, unless, in so doing, he clearly indicates that his actions in these various fields are paralleling his new decision to coordinate by direction. (underlining supplied)

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Those items that need additional clarification and new Directives

(1) If the ICI is to be responsible for coordination with the potency desired by the NSC, the Council must take certain steps to lend strength to his hand in the accomplishment of this task.

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(2) The responsibilities of the Director should be more clearly enumerated so as to make known to everyone, especially the Intelligence Departments and Agencies, what is the exact meaning of the function of "coordination." It should be further clarified that it is only in this field of coordination that the Director is asked to seek the advice of the IAC, and that beyond his duties of coordination are many staff functions which are still within the immediate responsibility of the DCI and are not of operational concern to the IAC agencies.

(3) Since the directives issued by the DCI are his implementing policies for operations in specific fields of endeavor, the inherent weaknesses of these directives bring about many of the problems under which we operate today. The statement of the NSC that the DCI directives, when issued, carry the weight of Council directives is just so many words of noble vintage unless the implementation function on these directives is adequately supported. However, this important and very essential function cannot be done by the DCI because the NSC specifically states "the respective intelligence chiefs shall be responsible for insuring that such orders or directives, when applicable, are implemented within their intelligence organizations." Accordingly, under present operational policy, we formulate the ideas, issue the directive and then assume a complete attitude of indifference as to the practicality of its application, and that we do because the NSC so orders.

(4) In discussing the production of Basic Intelligence (NSCIB 3.4 (5)) the DCI is "responsible for coordinating production and maintenance and for the editing, publication, and dissemination of these National Intelligence Surveys..." whereas in Paragraph 3.4 (3) of the same directive, it is plainly established that "changes in the outline or allocations shall be effected by agreement between the DCI and the agencies concerned. (underscoring supplied) Thus, the NSC must itself determine whether, in their clamor for "forthright initiative and leadership" they will agree to consistency of thought and expression in their directives.

"To direct with strength, or  
to direct with prior sugar-coated  
agreement  
that is the question!"

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(5) Certainly the timely and adequate dissemination of Current Intelligence is within the purview of the coordination responsibility of the DCI. However, regardless of the optional feature of following the unanimity concept of NSCIB 1 as to the use of the IAC by the DCI, NSCIB 3.1b (3) clearly states "Interagency dissemination of current intelligence shall be based on Interagency agreement ....." (underlining supplied)

(6) The same principle of NSC 50 which calls for "forthright initiative and leadership of the Director of the Central Intelligence" sanctions participation by the IAC "more actively in the continuing coordination of intelligence activities." (underlining supplied) This combine of suggesting in the one sentence the accomplishment of results by "leadership" and then asking for "coordination" with IAC is somewhat self-contradictory and neutralizes much of the effectiveness of the NSC 50 recommendations. It is tantamount to saying to the Director "you do it and be responsible, but in so doing, you must work with and accept the viewpoints of other people." His hands are free but his feet are fettered. For example, Section 4 of NSC 50 lists many questions which require "coordination" and hence must be resolved by the more active participation by the IAC in seeking and applying the necessary remedies. This view is substantiated by the recommendation which calls for action, not by the DCI "with forthright leadership" but by the "Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Advisory Committee."

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## Conclusion

I reemphasize the element of care and caution in the proposed undertaking and because of this apprehension, I am convinced that if the Director approaches the NSC with a position of strength, above and beyond the jurisdictional differences that exist between departmental and central viewpoints in,

- a) telling the Council concretely about his decision to adopt a more hard-hitting type of direction because of his experiences of the past few years and,

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- b) seeking from the Council their blessing on his decision, and specific written clarification of his responsibilities in some of the fields causing most of the trouble today, he will obtain the kind of power and authority which he needs to accomplish his mission and at the same time will not have fomented ill will on the part of the agencies with which he must still work.

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